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ABSTRACT: Most arguments can be presented in different forms, e.g. with explicit data or with an
explicit inference license and, in the latter case, with a modus ponens- or a modus tollens-inference
license. It is arguable that one form is more appropriate or effective with regard to a specific piece of
argumentation than another. However, in this paper it is argued that with regard to analogical reductio
ad absurdum argumentation, its alleged persuasive effect is due to a successful appeal to common
ground and not to its form.

KEY WORDS: analogical argumentation, argument form, common ground, humour, irony,
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1. INTRODUCTION
A study of the literature on reductio ad absurdum argumentation yields numerous
examples of analogical argumentation (McBurney & Mills 1964; Thompson 1971;
Hollihan & Baaske 1973; Freeley 1981; Jensen 1981; Tindale & Gough 1987). In
those examples the listener is forced to reject a certain standpoint, for failure to do so,
it is suggested, would entail a commitment to another, comparable standpoint which
was patently absurd. The commitment to the absurd position, it is suggested, is
implied in the assertion of the viewpoint under attack. The comparable standpoint is
supposed to be absurd because it contradicts either generally agreed opinions or wellknown facts. In the following argument the assertion that one should always reject the
death penalty is attacked on the basis of this kind of reasoning:
There is no case where we should reject the death penalty and therefore not even in the case of
Saddam Hussein, for if you reject the death penalty on principle in all cases, you also have to
do that with retrospective force in respect of the death sentences pronounced and carried out
after the Second World War in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe. (Letter to the NRC
Handelsblad, November 9, 2006)

In this argument the absurd implication consists of an analogical situation that—
according to the arguer—would be endorsed by any person who subscribes to the
standpoint that one should never reject death penalty. The implicit premise of the
argument can be supposed to be something like: no one wishes with retrospective
effect to revoke death penalties sentenced and carried out in the Netherlands and in
other European countries after World War II. In other words: that is an absurd idea.
Jansen, H. (2007). Common ground, argument form and analogical reductio ad absurdum. In H.V.
Hansen, et al. (Eds.), Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground, CD-ROM (pp. 1-10).
Windsor, ON: OSSA.
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Authors who discuss the reductio ad absurdum on the basis of examples of
analogical argumentation consider this kind of argumentation a very effective
rhetorical strategy because of its supposed irony and use of ridicule or humour
(McBurney & Mills 1964, p. 288, Jensen 1981, p. 189, Tindale & Gough 1987, p. 13
ff.). It is also commended for its simplicity and directness (Freeley 1981, p. 23).
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca suggest that this effect is due to the typical form of
reductio ad absurdum. Characteristic of the reductio ad absurdum form is the appeal
to the consequences which are alleged to be logically implied by the viewpoint under
attack—formulated as a conditional statement. Judging from Perelman & OlbrechtsTyteca, an appeal to consequences is an important means of making something appear
ridiculous:
(…) so [ridicule attaches to] anyone who sets forth principles whose unforeseen consequences
put him in opposition to ideas which are accepted in a given society, and which he himself
would not dare to contravene. (1969, p. 206)

In this respect they explicitly refer to the reductio ad absurdum as a strong means of
achieving this end; they even identify this as one of the strongest objections to be
made in argumentation (p. 207).
These remarks are interesting in the light of my research on argument forms,
because they suggest that from a rhetorical point of view analogical argumentation
presented in the reductio ad absurdum form has advantages over other forms. For
example, another form in which argumentation can be presented is the form with a
direct appeal to the comparable case instead of presenting this case as an implication
of the attacked viewpoint. The example about the death penalty of Saddam Hussein
can also be presented in such a form:
There is no case where we should reject the death penalty and therefore not even in the case of
Saddam Hussein, for you also don’t do that with retrospective force in respect of the death
sentences pronounced and carried out after the Second World War in the Netherlands and
elsewhere in Europe.

However, elsewhere (Jansen 2006) I argued that with regard to analogical
argumentation both the argument form of reductio ad absurdum and the form in
which a direct appeal is made to the comparable case are probably equally persuasive.
In this lecture I will elaborate on this conclusion and add some further considerations.
I will do so by exploring what makes an analogical reductio ad absurdum a
persuasive argument and discuss whether this is better expressed in one form rather
than the other. In order to contextualise the research, the paper starts with a discussion
of the notion of argument form and some forms that can be distinguished.
2. ARGUMENT FORM
I use ‘argument form’ as a notion that concerns the reconstruction that can be made of
the presentation of single argumentation. Apart from the specific formulations that
can be used for the standpoint and the premises, a single argument can be presented
with either explicit data or an explicit inference license, and with an inference license
containing either a modus ponens or modus tollens presentation with regard to the
order of content of antecedent and consequent and the distribution of negations. 1
Examples of these different presentations are: ‘She’s probably not at home, since her
1

I am not sure yet whether this overview is exhaustive. See also footnote 3.
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car is not outside’ (explicit data), ‘She’s probably not at home, for if her car is not
outside, she most likely isn’t’ (explicit inference license, modus ponens), and ‘She’s
probably not at home, otherwise [if she were at home] her car would be outside’
(explicit inference license, modus tollens). These forms require the following
reconstructions in pragma-dialectical terminology (1 being the standpoint, 1.1 the
explicit premise and 1.1’ the unexpressed premise; see van Eemeren & Grootendorst
1992):
1
1.1
1.1’

Y, because
X, and
if X, then Y

Suzanne is probably not at home, because
her car is not outside, and
(implicit: if her car is not outside, then she’s
probably not at home)

1
1.1
1.1’

Y, because
if X, then Y, and
X is the case

Suzanne is probably not at home, because
if her car is not outside, she most likely isn’t, and
(implicit: her car is not outside)

1
1.1
1.1’

Y, because
Suzanne is probably not at home, because
if not-Y, then not-X
if she were at home, her car would be outside and
not not-X (not-X is not true) her car is not outside

Very often the same argument can be presented in any of these forms. In all three
forms, the argument contains the same elements, sometimes with a slightly different
wording. For example, the different wording can concern the presence of negations in
the inference license. After all, the inference statement in modus tollens is the
contrapositive of the inference statement in modus ponens, which means that the
variables change places (being antecedent or consequent) and are each other’s
negation. Also the mood of verbs can be different (indicative or subjunctive), but this
is not necessarily so.
Elsewhere (Jansen forthcoming 2007a) I’ve argued that the reductio ad
absurdum is an argument form. That is to say: it is an argument type that is
characterised by its form instead of its pragmatic content. When an argument type is
defined by its pragmatic content, it is defined by the nature of the inference license,
or—in other words—by the nature of the argument scheme that is expressed in the
argument. Since all types of pragmatic content that may define an argument scheme
can occur in a reductio ad absurdum, the reductio ad absurdum cannot be defined by
a specific kind of pragmatic content. Instead, the reductio ad absurdum must be
characterised as a form, a conclusion that is reinforced by the fact that arguments in
reductio ad absurdum form can be restated into another form. I have shown this in the
introduction with regard to the analogical reductio ad absurdum argument about the
death penalty for Saddam Hussein, where a comparison is made between the death
penalty imposed on Saddam Hussein and those imposed on World War II criminals. A
reconstruction of the reductio ad absurdum argument looks as follows:
1.

There is no case where we should reject the death penalty and therefore
not even in the case of Saddam Hussein, for
1.1 If you reject the death penalty on principle in all cases, you also have to
do that with retrospective force in respect of the death sentences
pronounced and carried out after the Second World War in the
Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, and
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1.1’ No one would do that (i.e. ‘that would be absurd’)
This argument can be restated into the form with explicit data:
1.

There is no case where we should reject the death penalty and therefore
not even in the case of Saddam Hussein, for
1.1 You also do not do that with retrospective force in respect of the death
sentences pronounced and carried out after the Second World War in the
Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, and
1.1’ If you do not reject the one thing, you should not reject the other thing.
However, in the case of analogical argumentation the form with an explicit inference
license in modus ponens form is less likely: 2
1.

There is no case where we should reject the death penalty and therefore
not even in the case of Saddam Hussein, for
1.1 If you also do not do that with retrospective force in respect of the death
sentences pronounced and carried out after the Second World War in the
Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, you also should not reject the
death penalty in the case of Saddam Hussein 3 , and
1.1’ No one wants to reject the death penalty with retrospective force in
respect of the death sentences pronounced and carried out after the
Second World War in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe.
The form of reductio ad absurdum argumentation is very similar to modus tollens
(Jansen forthcoming 2007a). The difference between a ‘simple’ modus tollens and a
reductio ad absurdum may be the stepwise presentation in the reductio ad absurdum
and the explicit presentation of the antecedent as a hypothetical situation with
‘suppose that….’ (although in many examples such an explicit introduction of the
hypothetical antecedent is absent). 4 Some of the examples mentioned in the literature
2

In Jansen (2006) I argued that this form is less likely to be used, because it puts the important element
of the comparison in an unfocused position (the antecedent). However, my opinion now is that the
peculiarity of analogical argumentation expressed in this argument form is caused by the ‘newness’ of
the information presented in the antecedent. The antecedent of a conditional premise has to contain
information that has been referred to earlier, or must be accessible by experience (‘given’ information;
see for this terminology Östman & Virtanen 1999). An analogical case most often conveys new
information and therefore this argument form seems less appropriate for expressing the analogical
argument scheme (note that in the case of Suzanne not being at home, both the speaker and the hearer
can be standing in front of Suzanne’s house watching an empty parking space). For that matter, the
observation that principles of information structuring influence the choice for a specific argument form
downplays the role of rhetorical motives.
3
This inference license can also be presented the other way around, namely by starting with the
consequent: ‘you should not reject the death penalty in the case of Saddam Hussein if you do not also
reject…’. This makes me aware that there is more to argument form than I have discussed here.
4
With regard to the stepwise presentation reductio ad absurdum-argumentation is similar to what
Walton calls Slippery Slope-argumentation, that is to say: to those types of Slippery Slope
argumentation that do not make an appeal to causal consequences, but to logical consequences (the
sorites/linguistic and precedent types) (Walton, 1992, p. 74; 1996, p. 203). Walton himself points out a
connection between these types and the reductio ad absurdum, but according to him these types of
Slippery Slope are ‘not the same as the familiar type of reductio, where a proposition is reduced to
absurdity by deducing a contradiction from it’ (1992, p. 259); apparently because he holds the
mathematical view on reductio ad absurdum (see for a discussion of this view: Jansen forthcoming
2007a).
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as reductio ad absurdum-arguments and that can be classified as counterexamples (a
subclass of symptomatic argumentation) contain such an argument structure: the
argument goes from the one consequence to the other before ending in the ultimate
absurd consequence. For example: the standpoint that a sign saying no animals are
allowed in a store cannot be taken literally is defended by an appeal to the implication
that this would mean blind people could not enter the store, and consequently by the
further implication that the person may thus starve (which makes the argument
absurd) (Jensen 1981, p. 271). Also causal reductio ad absurdum arguments can
contain this more complex structure: ‘Humans and other meat-eaters are innately
friendly, for if they were not innately friendly, they would have eaten their offspring
and would have died out long ago’. Such more complex forms of the reductio ad
absurdum suit Hoaglund’s description of the reductio ad absurdum as ‘an extended
version of the modus tollens’ (2004, p. 421). However, a more complex form is not
necessary for classifying a certain piece of argumentation as reductio ad absurdum
argumentation.
3. WHAT MAKES AN ANALOGICAL REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM
PERSUASIVE
The fact that arguments can be presented in different forms legitimises the question
why an arguer would choose one form above the other. It also suggests that the choice
of one form or the other may be regarded as an instance of strategic manoeuvring with
the presentation (see van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002). The choice of a particular
argument form is largely determined by the correlation between its formal
characteristics, as for example the explicitness or implicitness of the inference license,
and the argument scheme that is expressed in the argument. For example, in Jansen
(forthcoming 2007b) I argue that with regard to arguments based on a counterexample
(the subtype of symptomatic argumentation), the formal characteristics of the form of
a reductio ad absurdum make it more effective than other forms and that the form
with explicit data is least persuasive. In contrast, with respect to analogical reductio
ad absurdum I have defended the hypothesis that the reductio ad absurdum form and
the form with explicit data are probably equally persuasive (Jansen 2006). 5 Below I
will present new, additional considerations with regard to these conclusions.
3.1 Characteristics of an analogical reductio and the effect of ridicule
Studying the literature and examples on reductio ad absurdum argumentation in
which an appeal to an analogy is made, it can be concluded that this type of argument
may contain a normative or a descriptive standpoint. The way in which the
consequences are perceived as absurd depends on the type of standpoint. When the
standpoint is normative, the absurd consequences consist in a contradiction with
opinions that are generally agreed upon. The example about Saddam Hussein’s death
penalty is an instantiation of such reductio ad absurdum argumentation. When the
standpoint is descriptive, the absurdity consists in a contradiction with well-known
facts. An example of this latter type is that it is not true that a corporation cannot
make an oral contract because it has no tongue, because, if it were true, a corporation
5

My main argument was that the reductio ad absurdum form seems to imply an appeal to common
ground and that a suggestion of such an appeal can also be reached in the normal form with explicit
data when these data are accompanied with indicators like ‘after all’ or when they are presented in the
form of a rhetorical question.
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could also not make a written contract because it has no hand (McBurney & Mills
1964, p. 288). Nevertheless, the standpoint remains implicit most of the time. In the
examples found in the literature the attack starts immediately with repeating the
attacked standpoint in the antecedent of the conditional premise and then the showing
its absurd consequence in the consequent. It must be reconstructed as a negative
standpoint towards a proposition that consists of the attacked viewpoint. This
proposition can be formulated either in a positive or in a negative way, depending on
the formulation of the viewpoint attacked. It has the following form: ‘(not-)X is
[negative qualification]’. The negative qualification can for example be: ‘not true’ or
‘ridiculous’ or ‘absurd’.
Characteristic of the examples that have been described in the literature as
reductio ad absurdum argumentation is that they are all instantiations of a subclass of
analogical argumentation, namely ‘refutation by logical analogy’. 6 This kind of
analogical argumentation is used in order to refute the opponent’s reasoning structure,
or, in other words, the justificatory power of the premise that the opponent has put
forward in order to defend that standpoint. Its justificatory power is attacked by
comparing it with a similar but absurd way of reasoning. Take for example the
argument about the oral contract: the reductio ad absurdum primarily focuses on the
insufficiency of the premise of corporations not having a tongue as a justification for
the standpoint that corporations cannot make oral contracts. In another example the
reasoning that football should be abolished because it results in death and injury is
compared with the reasoning that bathtubs should be abolished for the same reason
(Jensen 1981, p. 271). Or the standpoint that third world countries should not get selfdetermination because they lack experience in democratic government is compared
with not going near water without successful experience in swimming (Freeley 1981,
p. 230). Either the structure ‘A because B’ is attacked with the absurd structure ‘C
because B’ or ‘A because B’ is attacked by the absurd structure ‘C because D’. That a
way of reasoning is being attacked, is indicated by the formulations that are used:
‘then, according to your own argument…’ (McBurney & Mills 1964, p. 288), ‘if this
line of reasoning is valid…’ (Thompson 1971, p. 223) and ‘this reasoning should be
logically extended to…’ (Hollihan & Baaske 1973, p. 153). Also Dutch examples of
refutational analogy in reductio ad absurdum-form that I have found in newspapers
contain such like indicators: ‘ideeën wat nader uitwerken…’ [ideas which if
developed], ‘als je deze redenering door zou trekken…’ [and if you follow this line of
argument to its logical conclusion] en ‘bij consequent voortgezette redenering’ [from
this line of thought it logically follows].
According to Jensen (1981, p. 189) a reductio ad absurdum obtains its alleged
humorous and ironical effect because such an argument pushes the viewpoint under
attack to the extreme: the comparison is so dissimilar that it creates exaggeration and
humour. Also Whaley and Holloway (1996, p. 165) see it this way: ‘The more
exaggerated the base [i.e. the analogical way of reasoning with which the attacked
way of reasoning is compared], the more ridicule the analogy creates’. These remarks
suggest that the case being used for comparison is humorous in itself, because it is too
absurd to contemplate. However, analyses of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969)
and Tindale & Gough (1987) suggest that there is more to it than this. Combining
their ways of looking at the irony of an appeal to consequences gives the following
picture. First, humour is created when the case being used for comparison blatantly
contradicts generally shared norms. In other words: the compared case is extreme in
6

See Govier (2001). The type of argument she refers to is called ‘rebuttal analogy’ by Whaley &
Holloway (1996) and Whaley (1998).
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the sense that it transcends ‘the basic agreement we have about the limits of
reasonableness’ (Tindale & Gough 1987, p. 11). As a result, the one who holds the
attacked viewpoint is accused of inconsistent commitments (Perelman & OlbrechtsTyteca 1969, p. 206). Namely, on the one hand this person holds the viewpoint under
attack, whereas on the other hand, by so doing, he is committed to another viewpoint
that no rational person wishes to hold. Since it must be assumed that the person under
attack considers himself a rational being, it is suggested that he actually does not want
to hold the implied viewpoint and will withdraw the original viewpoint. However, for
the time being he is accused of holding two incompatible viewpoints and, according
to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (ibid.), this makes him look ridiculous. 7
Considering the hilarious examples of the analogical reductio ad absurdum presented
in the literature, it seems that the effect of absurdity can only be achieved when the
line of reasoning held up for comparison blatantly contradicts norms that are shared
by everyone. However, in my opinion the examples in the textbooks have this feature
because they must make sense to any reader in order to illustrate the concept of
absurdity. In contrast, an actual arguer does not have to deal with ‘any’ reader or ‘any’
listener. He only has to address the norms of his audience. For an arguer it is enough
if the viewpoint with which the attacked viewpoint is compared is absurd in the eyes
of his audience. So, an arguer has to refer to common ground between him and his
audience. Consider the following examples:
Example 1
‘It is ridiculous that cannabis is banned because of its stupefying effects, for
then alcohol should also be prohibited for being a drug.’
Example 2
‘It is ridiculous that we do not force the tobacco industry to pay for the
illnesses of smokers, for then ‘the polluter pays’ principle should also not
apply in the environmental sector.’ 8
In these examples a certain reasoning structure is attacked by comparing it with
another reasoning structure, which, it is suggested, is obviously unacceptable.
However, the viewpoint to be compared may only be absurd for a particular audience,
for example an audience of vintners and a left wing audience respectively. For others
there may be no appeal to common ground at all. An audience who have experience
of alcoholicism may very well favour a ban on alcohol and it is well-known that there
are those who think that the polluter pays principle goes too far. Because these
analogies do not appeal to common ground in the sense that any rational being would
find the compared viewpoint absurd, they do not have the same strikingly hilarious
effect of the examples in the literature. But if the arguer has correctly assessed the
norms of his audience, he can actually reach the same effect if the compared
viewpoint contradicts those norms. So, although we cannot regard examples 1 and 2
7

An analogical reductio ad absurdum is thus a very personal attack. Such an attack may be persuasive,
at least with respect to a third party, but there is also the danger it may alienate people (Jensen 1981, p.
189). Also Whaley & Holloway (1996, p. 166) and Whaley (1998, p. 355, p. 360) signal the risk of
being considered impolite when refuting someone’s standpoint by way of a rebuttal analogy. However,
whether and how this would influence the argument’s persuasiveness is subject of their further
research.
8
Example based on van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans (2005, p. 182).
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as yielding a commonly agreed upon absurd consequence, they are also instances of
reductio ad absurdum argumentation. After all, it is implied in these kinds of
arguments that the viewpoint presented for comparison must be regarded as absurd.
The argument, as it were, presupposes common ground about this. 9
3.2 The effect of argument form
Having established that the reductio ad absurdum’s absurdity is derived from an
appeal to common ground, I will now address the question whether these effects are
better reached by the typical argument form of a reductio ad absurdum than the
argument form with explicit data. As I have argued elsewhere, I think this is not the
case. This time, I draw my evidence from the features that create the reductio ad
absurdum’s ridiculous effect. Only when these features are present is there a chance
that the audience will forget to consider whether the comparison is valid and thus
whether the compared absurd viewpoint is indeed implied by the viewpoint under
attack. In my opinion, this observation implies that if the condition of actual absurdity
is indeed fulfilled, then it is less important to present the compared analogical case as
a consequence. This opinion is supported by highly ironic examples of absurd
analogies that are not presented in the typical reductio ad absurdum-form. For a start,
many examples can be found in Whaley & Holloway (1996) and Whaley (1998).
These examples begin by mentioning the attacked viewpoint, followed by
formulations like ‘that’s like …’ and ‘isn’t that like…. ?’ and then followed by the
alleged analogical viewpoint. Also the following examples, taken from a letter to the
Dutch newspaper the NRC-Handelsblad, show examples of analogical reductio ad
absurdum argumentation not presented in the typical reductio ad absurdum form:
Example 3
An attack on the standpoint that judges cannot wear veils for they must give an
impression of impartiality: ‘Should a black judge also use powder to make
himself white?’ (September 4, 2001)
Example 4
An attack on the standpoint that Islamic legislation may be introduced when
this is the democratic decision of the majority: ‘Does the minister believe that
in a democracy a majority can also re-introduce slavery?’ (September 4, 2006)
Example 5
‘Abolishing happy hours because fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds use them is
too ridiculous for words. You wouldn’t close down the motorway because it’s
possible to break the speed limit, would you? (March 26, 2007)
Despite their forms, we may very well regard these examples as instances of reductio
ad absurdum: (1) they are refutations of an opponent’s way of reasoning, (2) although
the standpoint in example 4 remains implicit, the one in example 5 is typical for an
analogical reductio ad absurdum, and—most importantly—(3) the alleged analogical
viewpoint expresses a blatant inconsistency with common ground. Actually, in
addition to these examples it must be noted that the formulation of some examples of
reductio ad absurdum in the literature also suggests that those authors are less
9

Therefore the argument is still a reductio ad absurdum when an arguer has miscalculated the norms of
his audience.
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concerned with making the appeal to consequences explicit. Jensen (1981, p. 271)
uses the formulation ‘such a contention is like saying…’ and Tindale & Gough (1987,
p. 13) present an example of an analogical reductio ad absurdum in which the
comparison is directly made by means of a rhetorical question.
Presumably, qualifying something as an analogical implication or
consequence—as happens in the typical argument form of reductio ad absurdum—
does not convey extra information with regard to qualifying something as an
analogical relationship. In both situations the analogical argumentation focuses on the
arguer under attack being committed to similar viewpoints. This commitment can be
invoked by ‘then also’, but equally by ‘also’ alone. I think that an analogical
viewpoint is the same as an implied analogical viewpoint, for being committed to an
analogical viewpoint already means that the analogical viewpoint is implied by the
viewpoint to which it is analogous. Therefore, I assume that with regard to analogical
argumentation an express appeal to implied consequences has less literal meaning
than with regard to other types of argumentation (symptomatic and causal
argumentation). Its main objective is the appeal to common ground and this objective
can both be reached in the argument form of reductio ad absurdum as in the form
with explicit data.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper I have presented a piece of my research on argument form and rhetorical
effect. It cannot be said in general whether a specific argument form is effective: this
question is—among others—related to the question of the argument scheme that is
used in the argumentation. In this paper I focused on analogical argumentation
presented in the form of a reductio ad absurdum. In the literature this kind of
argument is thought to be a very effective way of attacking a viewpoint due to the
humour and ridicule which it conveys. My research question was whether its alleged
effect can also be related to its specific argument form—being the form with an
explicit inference license formulated as in modus tollens. I have argued that this is not
the case. An analogical relationship may be viewed as an implication anyway, no
matter whether the implication is explicitly formulated as such.
What makes an analogical reductio ad absurdum persuasive is caused by other
factors than the argument form in which the argument is expressed. The most
important factor is that the compared viewpoint that is presented as absurd is indeed
absurd: the argument’s implied appeal to common ground must succeed. However,
common ground does not have to be understood as contradictory to opinions that are
generally accepted by any rational being, as is suggested by the way reductio ad
absurdum argumentation is presented in the literature, in particular by the humorous
examples presented there. Of course, contradiction with generally accepted norms
creates the comic effect. Nevertheless, for an arguer who addresses a specific
audience it may suffice to appeal to their specific norms, which may actually create a
humorous effect for that specific audience as well. Such an effect may be achieved
both in the case of the typical RAA form and in the case of an argument form with
explicit data.

link to commentary
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